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WILLS AND TRUSTS
I. PROOF AND CONTEST OF A WL
Henry v. Cottinghaml involved an action brought under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 2 for the construction of a
will and a determination of the rights of the parties thereunder.
The question presented was whether the action, which was
brought in the court of common pleas, could continue even
though a previously instituted proceeding in solemn form was
pending in the probate court.
Mrs. Jennie M. Cottingham died on January 11, 1968, and her
purported will was admitted to probate in common form on
March 30, 1968, with Jennie C. Henry and John A. Henry
qualified as executrix and executor. In the instrument Mrs.
Cottingham devised a farm to her daughter, Jennie C. Henry,
and her son, John C. Cottingham, to share and share alike, but
gave Jennie the option to buy her brother's half for a sum
which was considerably less than the present market value of the
land.
Jennie C. Henry and John A. Henry brought this action for
declaratory judgment on August 28, 1968, for construction of
the will and a determination of the parties' rights in regard to
the farm. However, prior to this time, on April 27, 1968, the
defendants had filed with the probate court a petition to prove
the will in solemn or due form of law. The trial court denied the
defendant's motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome
of the probate court's decision. The supreme court, reversing,
remarked somewhat admonishingly that the trial court had
permitted a collateral attack upon the probate court's decision.
By refusing to stay the action and by requiring the defendants
to question the validity of the will in the trial court, the court
allowed a prohibited collateral attack upon a will which had been
admitted to probate in common form by the probate court.
Under section 19-255 of the South Carolina Code of Laws of
1962, the probate of a will is conclusive as to the validity of the
instrument, unless within six months a petition to have the will
proved in solemn or due form of law is filed with the probate
court.8 Only through this direct proceeding can the validity of
1. 253 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.2d 387 (1969).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2001 to -2014 (1962).
3. Wooten v. Wooten, 235 S.C. 228, 110 S.E2d 922 (1959); Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 178 S.C. 194, 182 S.E. 640 (1935).
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the will be attacked. The decree of the probate court admitting
a will to probate is not subject to collateral attack, the court being
one of competent jurisdiction.4 Once the validity of the instru-
ment has been determined, questions as to the validity or effect
of any particular clause of the will are not within the juris-
diction of the probate court, but are matters of construction to
be determined by the court of common pleas.5
The court noted that in Rikard v. Miller" the court held that
an action to construe the meaning, effect, and intent of a will
could properly be brought under our Declaratory Judgments
Act. The act itself states that any question of the validity or
construction of such an instrument can properly be brought
thereunder. The court reasoned, however, that, once a will has
been admitted to probate, there remains no issue as to the
validity of the will to be determined under the Uniform Dec-
laratory Judgments Act. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention
that the present question was the proper subject of action for
declaratory judgment, the court quoted from a statement by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, a state whose Declaratory
Judgments Act is similar to that of South Carolina:
The Declaratory Judgment Act, G.S. Ch. 1, art. 26, is
designed to provide an expeditious method of pro-
curing a judicial decree construing wills, contracts, and
other written instruments and declaring the rights and
liabilities of parties thereunder. It is not a vehicle for
the nullification of such instruments. Nor is it a sub-
stitute or alternate method of contesting the validity of
wills. 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion appears to be
in accord with the general rule in other jurisdictions that have
adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.8 The rule
has been stated:
4. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 178 S.C. 194, 182 S.E. 640 (1935).
5. Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S.C. 136, 128 S.E. 841 (1925); Burkett v.
Whittemore, 36 S.C. 428, 15 S.E. 616 (1891).
6. 231 S.C. 98, 97 S.E.2d 257 (1957).
7. 253 S.C. at 293, 170 S.E.2d at 391, quoting from Yount v. Yount, 258
N.C. 236, 128 S.E.2d 613 (1962) (emphasis added).
8. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which was first introduced in
1922, has been adopted by a majority of the states with slight modifications.
The Act provides that courts have the power to declare legal rights whether
or not further relief could be claimed, that no action shall be open to the
objection that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for, that the
declaration may be either negative or affirmative, and that such declarations
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment 22 Am. Jur. 2D Declaratory
Judgments § 4 (1965).
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Since the remedy of a declaratory judgment is not a
substitute for established and available remedies, . . .
such remedy is unavailable where the question involving
a will on which an adjudication is sought is already
before the appropriate court under a prescribed statu-
tory procedure. Statutes relating to such actions are
not designed to enable other courts to supersede the
functions of a probate court in the probate of wills.9
II. CONSTRUCTMON OF A WILL: ADMISSION OF
EXTRinSIC EVIDENCE
In 1964, in Shelley v. Shelley' ° the South Carolina Supreme
Court rendered a significant opinion regarding the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence, particularly the testator's declarations of
intention, to resolve an "equivocation, or latent ambiguity""
contained in a will. The testator, M.B. Shelley, devised his estate
"to be divided between" his two sons. The "southern part" of his
estate was to go to his son, Bevin, and the "northern part" to
his other son, Lanneau. Although the provision named particular
buildings to be included in each son's part, there was no specific
dividing line established between the two estates.
The master in equity construed the instrument's language to
mean that the testator intended for the sons to receive equal
acreage; the trial court adopted this construction of the will.
The supreme court, in reversing, found that there was nothing
in the will to indicate an intention that the property should be
equally divided and remanded the case for a factual determina-
tion of the dividing line. The court also ruled that extrinsic
evidence, including direct evidence of the declaration of the
testator as to his intention, could properly be received in making
the determination. Upon remand, the master in equity ruled
favorably for the defendant, Bevin Shelley; but the trial court
entered a decree ordering a division of the property along the
lines proposed by the plaintiff, Lanneau Shelley, which division
9. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 100 (1956).
10. 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964). See Karesh, Wills and Trusts,
1964-1965 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18 S.C.L. Rav. 165, 185 (1965),
and Note, Admissibility of Testator's Declaration of Intention, 17 S.C.L. REv.
276, 283 (1965) for a full and scholarly discussion of the principles enunciated
in the Shelley Case.
11. Id. at 606, 137 S.E.2d at 855. The court, in using these particular
words, failed to distinguish between their relative significance in regard to
the context in which they were used. This is subsequently commented on in
this article.
[Vol. 22
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the court felt conformed more nearly with the testator's inten-
tion. The trial court's decision was based primarily on the
testimony received from the scrivner of the will and the testator's
widow relating to declarations of the testator's intentions.
On the second appeal, in 1969, where the supreme court af-
firmed the decision of the trial court,'1 2 the only issue raised by
the parties related to the factual determination as to the proper
dividing line, which restricted the court to a review for errors
of law. The court, on its own initiative, however, raised and
affirmed its earlier decision that parol evidence, including dec-
larations of the testator's intent, was admissible. Although
admitting that there was now some disagreement among the
members of the court as to whether the will contained an
equivocation which could properly be resolved by such evidence,
the court pointed out that a majority was of the view that there
was no error in the previous opinion.
The general rule is that indirect extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to resolve a latent ambiguity which arises when the
words of the will are applied to the person or thing which they
describe.13 This is justified on the ground that the evidence is
received only to eiplain or resolve the meaning of the words
used by the testator.14 Direct evidence of the testator's declara-
tions of intention, however, is generally not admissible in such
a case, unless there is an equivocation appearing in the will, the
logic being that the danger of such declarations competing and
overthrowing the words of the instrument is reduced by the
presence of the equivocation. 15 An equivocation has been defined
as existing where a description applies exactly to two or more
persons or things.'6 An equivocation has also been defined as
existing where the description applies equally and partially to
two or more persons or things.17 Under either view, an equivo-
cation is more strictly defined than an ambiguity, which only
involves a description that could apply to two or more persons
or things.
12. Shelley v. Shelley, 253 S.C. 238, 169 S.E.2d 764 (1969).
13. Foreign Mission Bd. of So. Baptist Convention v. Gaines, 42 F. Supp.
85 (E.D.S.C. 1942); Perry v. Morgan, 1 Strob. Eq. 8 (S.C. 1846); Pell v.
Ball, Speer's Eq. 48 (S.C. 1843).
14. Note, Admissibility of Testators Declarations of Intention, 17 S.C.L.
Rv. 276, 279 (1965).
15. 9 WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE § 2472 (3d ed. 1940).
16. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961).
17. Id.; WIGMORE, supra note 15.
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The importance of the court's opinion, as given on the first.
appeal and affirmed on the second appeal, lies in the language
used to describe the situation in which direct evidence of the
testator's intention is admissible:
Since some of the testimony offered in this case dealt
with declarations by the testator himself, we think it
well to point out that while declarations of intention on
the part of a testator are ordinarily excluded from con-
sideration, they are, nevertheless, according to the great
weight of authority, receivable to assist in interpreting
an equivocation, or latent ambiguity. The prohibitory
exception is based on the risk of allowing an extrinsic
utterance of intent to come into competition with the
terms of the document on the same subject and perhaps
to prevail against them. In the case of an equivocation,
or latent ambiguity, this risk does not exist. There can
be no competition with the words of the document by
declarations which merely expound and make more
specific the words used in the document.1
8
Although the language in Mr. Shelley's will would appear to
present an equivocation which could properly be resolved by
testimony as to the testator's intention, the court, in using the
words "equivocation, or latent ambiguity," does not indicate
whether it is ruling that such direct evidence is admissible where
equivocations or latent ambiguities exist or whether it is ad-
nissible only where an equivocation, a type of latent ambiguity,
is present. The court failed to make clear whether its ruling
applied to situations where equivocations or latent ambiguities
exist, or whether it was using the term, "latent ambiguity," only
to describe the more restrictive term, "equivocation."' 9
III. CoN sTRUcTION OF A WmL: GENERAL RuLrs
In King v. South Carolina Tax CommissionP° the court ap-
plied general rules of construction in determining that the
estate devised to the widow of the decedent was a life estate
and not a fee simple as the devisee had contended. Mrs. King
brought an action for declaratory judgment to establish the tax
liability of the estate after the tax commission refused to allow
her claim for the marital deduction provided for by South
18. 244 S.C. at 606, 137 S.E_2d at 857 (emphasis added).
19. See also Wells v. Salvation Army, 190 S.C. 484, 3 S.E2d 241 (1939).
20. 173 S.E2d 92 (S.C. 1970).
[VOeL 22
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Carolina law ;21 this deduction is granted where the estate
devised is one in fee simple.
The will provided as follows:
Item 1. We hereby direct the executor or executrix of
the estate of us to pay all of our just debts and funeral
expenses out of the first moneys coming into their re-
spective hands, and to erect markers on our graves.
Item 2. We hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of our property of every
sort and description and wheresoever situate unto the
survivor of us.
Item 3. Upon the death of the survivor of us, we hereby
give, devise and bequeath such rest, residue and re-
mainder of our property as follows ... [thereafter
naming a number of persons to whom the remainder
should go.]
22
The trial court found that Item 2 was a devise in fee simple
to Mrs. King; the court further found that Item 3 applied only
if the survivor failed to execute a new will prior to death or in
the event that both the testators died simultaneously. In re-
versing, the supreme court found that the provisions of Item
3 "are clear and unequivocal and show the intent of the testator
to devise the remainder, at the death of the survivor, to the
beneficiaries named."
23
Although the court acknowledged that, under section 19-232
of the Code of Laws of South Carolina,24 Item 2, if construed
alone, would have the effect of devising a fee simple to the
survivor, the court determined that such a result was not possible
when the will was considered as a whole. The general rule is
that all the parts of a will should be given effect, if under a
reasonable interpretation they can be harmonized with each other
and the will as a whole.25 With this in mind the court simply
followed the basic rule governing construction of a will: the
intent of the testator, as expressed by the words he uses, must.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-455 (1962).
22. 173 S.E.2d at 93.
23. Id. at 94.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-232 (1962) provides:
No words of limitation shall be necessary to convey an estate in fee
simple by devise but every gift of land by devise shall be con-
sidered as a gift in fee simple unless such a construction be incon-
sistent with the will of the testator, express or implied.
25. Shevlin v. Colony Lutheran Church, 227 S.C. 598, 88 S.E.2d 674 (1955).
1970]
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be given effect unless such contravenes a settled rule of law or
public policy.
2 6
In Lee v. Citizens & o&uthern National Bank, 27 an action for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, the court
reiterated several basic rules as to the construction and interpre-
tation of a will. Robert A. Smyth left a will which included the
following as Item XVII:
I give, bequeath and devise to my nephew, W. Loring
Lee, Jr., of Sumter, South Carolina, for life, all of my
right, title and interest in Cedar Grove Plantation,
near St. Paul, Clarendon County, South Carolina; along
with all of my right, title and interest in the land with
improvements thereon at St. Paul, South Carolina, the
same consisting of a store and filling station now occu-
pied by the Texas Company; and my two-thirds (2/3)
interest in the telephone line from St. Paul, South
Carolina, to Summerton, South Carolina; with the re-
mainder, in fee simple, to his son and my grandnephew,
Richard Smyth Lee. Should my nephew, W. Loring
Lee, Jr., predecease me, then I give, bequeath and devise
to his wife, Elizabeth Smyth Lee, the said property for
her lifetime, with the remainder to Richard Smyth Lee.
Should Richard Smyth Lee predecease me and both of
his parents, then the remainder interest in the properties
above shall go, in fee simple, to his brother, W. Loring
Lee, 111.28
This action arose when the defendant refused to accept the deed
to the Cedar Grove Plantation on the premise that the plaintiff,
representing the purported owner of the land, could not convey
good title because Richard Smyth Lee did not have a vested
remainder in the devised property, but had instead a contingent
remainder which could not be conveyed. The trial court, reject-
ing the defendant's contention that it was necessary for Richard
to survive the testator and both of his parents before the interest
could vest in him, held that the word, "and," was to be con-
strued literally and noted that it would have been illogical for
the testator to require Richard to survive all three persons. The
supreme court, affirming, adopted the decree of the trial court
as its opinion.
26. Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E2d 637 (1952); McDonald v.
Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793 (1921).
27. 253 S.C. 556. 172 S.E.2d 114 (1970).
28. Id. at 559, 172 S.E.2d at 115.
[Vol. 22
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The court stated that, as a first rule of construction, the
testator's intent should be ascertained and given effect. Inter-
preting the first sentence of Item XVII of the will as clearly
establishing the testator's intention, the court noted the following
rule as established in Walker v. AlZverson:
29
When a gift is made in one clause of a will in clear and
unequivocal terms, the quantity or quality of the estate
given should not be cut down or qualified by words of
doubtful import found in a subsequent clause.30
Once an intention has been so established and does not violate
any established rule of law, arbitrary or technical rules of con-
struction should not be permitted to defeat the effect of such an
intention.31 The court also alluded to the general rule that the
law favors remainders which vest at the earliest possible time
consistent with the intention of the testator. 2 Applying these
rules the court determined that the remainder vested at the death
of the testator, since Richard Smyth Lee and W. Loring Lee,
Jr., were both alive at that time. The court viewed the remaining
sentences in Item XVII as surplusage only.
IV. ADmINISTitAION OF A WML
A. Doctrine of Relation Back
Glenn v. E.L Dupont De Nemours & Co.33 presented the South
Carolina Supreme Court with the novel question of whether the
"doctrine of relation back" would apply to the probate court's
appointment of the plaintiff as administratrix de bonis non to
validate a previously instituted action initiated by the plaintiff
without proper standing as administratrix. The action was
brought within the six year statute of limitations, but Mrs.
Glenn was not reinstated as administratrix until after the period
had run.
Dorothy R. Glenn initiated the suit to recover damages for
the wrongful death of her husband, Carl Glenn, from whose
estate she had been duly discharged as administratrix on Feb-
ruary 19, 1962. The trial judge held that an order of the probate
court reinstating Mrs. Glenn as the administratrix nuno pro
29. 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966 (1910).
30. Id. at 60, 68 S.E. at 968.
31. Albergotti v. Summers, 205 S.C. 179, 31 S.E2d 129 (1944).
32. See, e.g., Wannamaker v. South Carolina State Bank, 176 S.C. 133,
179 S.E. 896 (1934); Walker v. Alverson, 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966 (1910).
33. 174 S.E.2d 155 (S.C. 1970).
1970]
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tuno was ineffective, but that the fact that she was discharged
as administratrix when the action was brought was not fatal
to the complaint. On his own motion, the trial judge allowed an
amendment to the complaint making her administratrix de bonis
non.
The supreme court, in a three-two decision, rejected the trial
court's position that the "doctrine of relation back" applied.
The application of this doctrine would have given the complaint
validity by substituting an administratrix de bonio non after
the action was brought.84 After emphasizing that an action
under the Wrongful Death Statute 5 can be brought only by a.
legally appointed administrator or executor of the estate of the
deceased, the court likened the status of Mrs. Glenn, as adminis-
tratrix at the time of bringing the action, unto that of a non-
existing party.
It is well settled that where an action is brought in the
name of a non-existing plaintiff, an amendment of com-
plaint by substituting the proper party will be re-
garded as the institution of a new action as regards the
statute of limitations.3 6
The majority's opinion was supported by an Iowa Supreme
Court case, Pearson v. Anthony.37 In Pearson the court refused
to allow an action to be brought by a decedent's wife who had
expected to be appointed administratrix of his estate, but had
not been so appointed at the time the suit was brought because
of a lack of funds. The court held that a purported institution
of an action by an individual pretending to act as administratrix
was not effective to commence the action and avoid the bar of
the statute of limitations.
In Graves v. TVebor 3s the North Carolina Supreme Court,
applying the "relation back doctrine," permitted a similar
action by a plaintiff who believed herself to be the adminis-
tratrix of the decedent's estate at the time of the institution of
34. In preventing the statute of limitations from barring an action brought
by an administrator prior to his official appointment, the doctrine of relation
back is implemented to give the administrator standing to bring such a suit
from the time of the decedent's death. Very closely related to this is the
practice of allowing the pleadings to be amended to assert the complainant's
capacity as administrator without bringing a new action. See Annot, 3
A.L.R.3D 1235 (1965).
35. S.C. ConE ANx. § 10-1951, et seq. (1962).
36. 174 S.E.2d at 158, quoting from Annot., 8 A.L.Rh2d 6, 57 (1949).
37. 218 Iowa 697, 254 N.W. 10 (1934).
38. 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963).
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the action. The South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,
however, that in Graves the plaintiff had actually taken steps
to secure her position as administratrix prior to bringing the
suit, whereas Mrs. Glenn, in the present action, had taken no
such steps. As the North Carolina Court clarified its holding:
[W]e must not be understood as holding that one who
has never applied for letters or who, having applied,
had no reasonable grounds for believing that he had
been duly appointed, can institute an action for wrong-
ful death, or any other cause, upon a false allegation of
appointment and thereafter validate that allegation by
subsequent appointment. We think that the Iowa Court
correctly dealt with a pretender.39
Deciding that Mrs. Glenn had no grounds upon which to believe
that she was duly appointed as administratrix at the time the
action was brought, the majority concluded that the action was
a nullity and could not be sustained under the "doctrine of
relation back."
The dissent pointed out that the defendant, by demurring to
the complaint early in the proceedings on the ground of improper
joinder and, thus, from the beginning of the action, admitting
knowledge of the discharge of Mrs. Glenn as administratrix, was
estopped from subsequently challenging her legal status as
administratrix. The majority's position was also attacked on
the basis that the "relation back doctrine" is applicable to a
situation such as the one presented and is supported in principle
by South Carolina authority.40 Significant was the attention
drawn to the majority view:
In the great majority of cases that have considered the
doctrine of relation back of the appointment of an ad-
ministrator as it might affect the running of the
statute of limitations, it has been held that such an
appointment made after the statute has run against a
claim will relate back to validate actions taken on the
claim within the statutory period by the person subse-
quently appointed administratrix, thus barring reliance
upon the defense of limitations by the party against
39. 174 S.E.2d at 159, quoting front Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 694,
133 S.E2d 761, 767 (1963).
40. See Martin v. Fowler, 51 S.C. 164, 28 S.E. 312 (1897); Cook v.
Cook, 24 S.C. 204 (1885) ; Haselden v. Whitesides, 2 Strob. 353 (S.C. 1848) ;
Walker v. May, 2 Hill Eq. 22 (S.C. 1834); Witt v. Elmore, 2 Bailey 595
(S.C. 1832).
1970]
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whom the claim is asserted on behalf of the estate. Such
result has been reached in wrongful death actions as
well as in other types of actions.4'
The liberal attitude of the majority of courts in allowing the
substitution of a proper plaintiff for an improper one has been
explained in the following manner:
It is submitted, although the courts do not expressly
state so, that the underlying reasons for the application
of the doctrine of relation back as a mean of defeating
the defense of the running of the statute of limitations
is the desire of the courts not to have valid claims
avoided by legal technicalities provided the adminis-
trator acted in good faith and had some reasonable
grounds for believing that he had been duly appointed.
42
When the majority view allowing such substitution and the
absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the plain-
tiff in the present action are considered, there would appear
to be considerable merit in the dissent's position. As the dissent
pointed out:
[Tihe real issue . . . is, simply stated, whether, under
the circumstances, the defendant by its procedures and
motions may be allowed to force the plaintiff in this
action into position where a new action will have to be
commenced, to which the defendant may assert the
defense of the six year statute of limitations.
43
B. Vrenue of Corporate Executor
In Keller v. The Bank of Orangeburg,44 the supreme court
passed upon a novel question in this state; the question presented
was whether a corporate executor has an official residence for
purposes of venue in transitory actions. The plaintiff, as execu-
tor of the estate of a Calhoun County resident, Mrs. Hittie M.
Fairey, brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas for
Calhoun County against the Bank of Orangeburg, executor of
the estate of James A. Moss, a resident and attorney of Orange-
burg County. The complaint alleged that Mr. Moss was retained
by the plaintiff to handle all the legal matters connected with
Mrs. Fairey's estate, but that at the time of his death the greater
41. 174 S.E.2d at 162 (dissenting opinion), quoting from Annot, 3 A.L.R.3d
1235, 1237 (1965).
42. Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1235, 1237 (1965).
43. 174 S.E.2d at 159 (dissenting opinion).
44. 253 S.C. 66, 169 S.E2d 99 (1970).
[Vol. 22
11
Jones: Wills and Trusts
Published by Scholar Commons,
WILLS SURVEYED
number of the legal problems surrounding the estate remained
to be solved. The recovery sought was a refund of $55,000.00 of
the $75,000.00 paid in advance to Mr. Moss for his services.
The defendant bank, a corporation with offices in both
Calhoun County and Orangeburg County, made a motion for a
change of venue on the ground that the residence of the bank
should be considered as being only in the county where it was
appointed and qualified as executor. The trial court denied the
motion, and the bank appealed. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, affirming, refused to hold that the corporate fiduciary's
residence is restricted to the county of its appointment and
qualification.
The majority rule as to venue in transitory actions brought
against an executor or administrator has been stated as follows:
Under general statutes with respect to venue, and in
the absence of some special statute to the contrary, a
personal representative, such as an executor or adminis-
trator, may be sued in the county in which he resides,
regardless of where the estate is pending settlement or
where a decedent might have been sued, and he is
entitled to have the suit brought in the county where he
resides and was served.4
5
Upon review of the authorities in other states, the court
pointed out that, while at common law the executor was sued at
the place of his residence, some jurisdictions have adopted
mandatory statutes fixing venue only in the county of ap-
pointment and qualification, and others, like South Carolina.46
have adopted permissive statutes which allow, but do not require,
that the action be brought in the county of qualification. Aside
from those states having such a mandatory statute, the court
could find but one state, West Virginia, where the court had
adopted a broadly stated rule that the fiduciary has an official
residence to which venue in a transitory action is restricted.
The defendant contended that, if the court refused to adopt
a rule establishing such an official residence, a testator in
45. 92 C.J.S. Venue § 58 (1955).
46. S.C. CoDs ANN. § 10-303 (1962) provides in part: "In all other cases
th action shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the
time of the commencement of the action." S.C. CoDE AN. § 10-304 (1962)
provides in part: "Any executor or executrix may likewise be sued in the
county where the testator's will has been proved or admitted to probate."
1970]
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choosing a corporate executor, would subject his estate to suit
in as many counties as the corporation has offices. In reply,
the court pointed to the protection afforded by the provisions of
section 10-310 of the South Carolina Code of Laws,47 which
provides for a change of venue in proper cases where harsh or
unjust results would occur. This section is available where an
inequitable situation arises because one of the parties is a multi-
branch corporation.
VI. TRUSTS: EQUITABLE NATUmE OF A FmucIARY RELATIONSHIP
In Davis v. Creenwood Telephone Co.,48 an action involving a
fiduciary relationship, a conflict arose as to whether the relation-
ship should be characterized as equitable which would make
the action subject to mandatory reference as provided by South
Carolina Law.49 McFarland Davis, on behalf of himself and
the taxpayers of the City of Greenwood brought an action
against the Greenwood United Telephone Company, Inc., and
the Commission of Public Works to hold the Commission ac-
countable for the money allegedly due from the telephone
company for use of the Commission's utility poles. The com-
plaint alleged that the Commission of Public Works acted in
bad faith in managing the property of the taxpayers of Green-
wood and permitted, "in violation of trust," the telephone com-
pany to use the property held in trust for the taxpayers for
twenty years without cost. Upon a decree of the trial court
ordering a general reference, the plaintiff appealed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court. The supreme court, affirming,
decided that the lower court was correct in granting the decree
referring the cause to the master in equity.
The court concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff
and the Commission of Public Works, as presented in the com-
plaint, was clearly one based upon fiduciary responsibility. The
court recited that all trusts fall within the jurisdiction of
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-310 (1962) provides that the court may change
the place of trial in the following circumstances:
(1) When the county designated for that purpose in the com-
plaint is not the proper county;
(2) When there is reason to believe that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had therein; and
(3) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change.
48. 253 S.C. 318, 170 S.E.2d 384 (1969).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1402 (1962) provides that compulsory reference may
be ordered by the court in all equitable actions and for all equitable issues
involved in actions at law.
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equityB0 ; the fact that the plaintiff was seeking recovery in
monetary damages was not necessarily decisive as to a determina-
tion of such jurisdiction.51 Apart from this relationship, which
provides equity jurisdiction, the court pointed to an additional
reason for the equitable classification of the action. In Jefferies
v. Harvey52 the court held that, in an action involving intricate
and complicated accounting, it would be impractical for an
ordinary jury to attempt to comprehend and decide the issues
involved correctly. The court pointed to the defendants' affi-
davits as evidence of the complexity of the account between the
plaintiff and the defendants and noted the difficulty of an
accounting implicit in the recovery requested by the complaint.
Quoting from Coleman v. Coleman,53 the court reviewed the
scope of the mandatory order of reference in regard to equity in
our state:
[T]he rule, now settled in this state is that a compulsory
order of reference should be granted not only in all
equitable cases, but also in action at law where equitable
issues are involved; and that equitable issues are in-
volved within this rule whenever the trial of the action
will involve a complicated, intricate, and long account-
ing that it would be impracticable for a jury to properly
examine and adjust, or where it would be impracticable
for a jury to make the necessary computations and ad-
justments necessary to ascertain the truth and to do
justice between the parties. And this rule is given spe-
cial emphasis in cases where the relationship between
the litigants is of a fiduciary character or involves an
alleged breach of trust.514
RICHARD A. JONES, JR.
50. 253 S.C. at 322, 170 S.E.2d at 385, citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 211 (1871) and Winn v. Harby, 171 S.C. 301, 172 S.E. 135 (1933).
51. 253 S.C. at 322, 170 S.E.2d at 385, citing I Po-IERoY's EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 158 (5th ed. 1941).
52. 206 S.C. 245, 33 S.F_2d 513 (1945).
53. 208 S.C. 103, 37 S.E.2d 305 (1946).
54. 253 S.C. at 323, 170 S.E2d at 386, quoting from Coleman v. Coleman,
208 S.C. 103, 37 S.E.2d 305 (1946) (emphasis added).
19701
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/14
